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Abstract
Cryptographic protocols are small programs which involve a high level of concurrency and which are
difﬁcult to analyze by hand. The most successful methods to verify such protocols are based on rewriting
techniques and automated deduction in order to implement or mimic the process calculus describing the
execution of a protocol. We are interested in the intruder deduction problem, that is vulnerability to pas-
sive attacks in presence of equational theories which model the protocol speciﬁcation and properties of the
cryptographic operators. In the present paper, we consider the case where the encryption distributes over the
operator of anAbelian group or over an exclusive-or operator.We prove decidability of the intruder deduction
problem in both cases. We obtain a PTIME decision procedure in a restricted case, the so-called binary case.
These decision procedures are based on a careful analysis of the proof systemmodeling the deductive power of
the intruder, taking into account the algebraic properties of the equational theories under consideration. The
analysis of the deduction rules interacting with the equational theory relies on themanipulation ofZ-modules
in the general case, and on results from preﬁx rewriting in the binary case.
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1. Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are ubiquitous in distributed computing applications. They are em-
ployed for instance in internet banking, video on demand services, wireless communication, or
secure UNIX services like ssh or scp. Cryptographic protocols can be described as relatively
simple programs which are executed in an untrusted environment.
Verifying protocols is notoriously difﬁcult, and even very simple protocols which look complete-
ly harmless may have serious security holes, as it was demonstrated by the ﬂaw of the Needham-
Schroederprotocol foundbyLowe [1] using amodel-checking tool. It took 17 years since theprotocol
was published to ﬁnd an attack, a so-called man in the middle attack. An overview of authentication
protocols known a decade ago can be found in [2], more recent data bases of protocols and known
ﬂaws are [3,4].
There are different approaches to modeling cryptographic protocols and analyzing their security
properties: process calculi like the spi-calculus [5], so-called cryptographic proofs (see, for instance,
[6]), and the approach of Dolev and Yao [7] which consists in modeling an attacker by a deduc-
tion system. This deduction system speciﬁes how the attacker can obtain new information from
previous knowledge, which he has either obtained by eavesdropping the communication between
honest protocol participants (in case of a passive attacker), or by eavesdropping and fraudulently
emitting messages, thus provoking honest protocol participants to reply according to the protocol
rules (this is the case of a so-called active attacker). We call intruder deduction problem the question
whether a passive eavesdropper can obtain a certain information from messages that he observes
on the network.
1.1. Algebraic properties
Classically, the veriﬁcation of cryptographic protocols was based on the so-called perfect cryp-
tography assumptionwhich states that it is impossible to obtain any information about an encrypted
message without knowing the exact key necessary to decrypt this message. Unfortunately, this per-
fect cryptography assumption has been proved too idealistic: there are protocols which can be
proved secure under the perfect cryptography assumption, but which are in reality insecure since
an attacker can use properties of the cryptographic primitives in combination with the protocol
rules to learn some secret informations. These properties are typically expressed as equational
axioms (so-called algebraic properties). Algebraic properties which are not used explicitly in the
protocol can still be exploited by an attacker to mount an attack; see [8] for an overview of the
veriﬁcation of cryptographic protocols in presence of algebraic properties. For instance, many cryp-
tographic protocols manipulate data and operations that actually use an Abelian group. The Wired
Equivalent Privacy protocol [9], Gong’s protocol [10], and Bull’s protocol [11] use explicitly in their
speciﬁcation the exclusive-or operation (which has, in addition to being an Abelian group, the nil-
potence property x + x = 0). Moreover, the cryptographic DES algorithm and the more recent AES
rely on the algebraic property of the exclusive-or. These two properties employed with properties
of the encryption algorithms are the most commonly used, hence the most important ones.
Finally, note that the well-known cryptosystem RSA has the property {a ∗ b}k = {a}k ∗ {b}k ,
where {x}k denotes the encryption of message x with key k , if we abstract from the modulus used
in the RSA encryption operation. This property of RSA is the distributivity of the encryption
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operation over the multiplication of non-null integers modulo n = pq where p , q are large prime
numbers. Strictly speaking, this structure is not an Abelian group but a commutative semigroup
since some of the elements do not have an inverse. In fact, the only elements without inverse are the
multiples of p (i.e., p , 2p , . . . , (q− 1)p) and of q (i.e., q, 2q, . . . , (p − 1)q), totaling p + q− 2 = O(√n)
elements without inverse, while the total number of elements is pq− 1 = O(n). Hence, this structure
is “mostly” an Abelian group since the vast majority of elements does have an inverse. Besides, the
assumption of an Abelian group leads to an over-approximation of the intruder capabilities (since
we assume that the intruder can inverse all elements, where in reality this is not true). This may
lead to false positives (claiming that there is an attack when none exists), but is safe for proving
non-existence of an attack.
1.2. The state of the art
The ﬁrst step in deciding protocol (in)security is usually to prove that the intruder deduction
problem is decidable, therefore this question can be seen as a prerequisite to solving the more
general problem of an active intruder. Both problems are decidable1 for the exclusive-or and
for Abelian groups [12,13], as well as for modular exponentiation [14,15] which is modeled by a
restricted axiomatization. Therefore, the intruder deduction problem is decidable in all these cases,
usually with a polynomial time complexity. The intruder deduction problem is decidable in poly-
nomial time in the case of the equational theory of a homomorphism [16], and in both the case of
exclusive-or combinedwith a homomorphismandAbelian groups combinedwith a homomorphism
[17]. Protocol security has been shown decidable in case of a homomorphism that distributes over
the exclusive-or [18], and undecidable in case of a homomorphism that distributes over an Abelian
group [19].
Several works [20–23] have been done to characterize classes of equational theories for which a
generic algorithm could apply. These theories are presented by a rewrite system, and the required
property is that the right-hand side of a rewrite rule is a strict subterm of the left-hand side. Another
trend [24] is to devise a combination algorithm which allows us to combine decision algorithms
that have been deﬁned for independent equational theories, yielding a solution for the union of the
theories (in the active case). Finally, a recent approach [25] is to try to have a general resolution
technique that relies on narrowing, but this has not yet succeeded to come up with a satisfactory
solution.
1.3. On passive and active attacks
Proving security of a protocol against passive attacks is in itself an important problem. In fact,
there are many situations in which an intruder cannot interact with the legitimate protocol partic-
ipants, be it due to physical restrictions of the communication channel, or due to the fact that an
intruder only gets hold of a log of a protocol session after the communication channel is closed.
In general, however, one usually wishes in the end to obtain a guarantee of security against active
attacks, that is security even in a scenario where an attacker completely controls the network.
1 Protocol security is considered in these papers for a ﬁxed number of sessions.
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Security against passive attacks is obviously a sub-problem of security against active attacks,
since any active attacker can of course try to obtain a secret by purely passive means. Security
against active attacks is undecidable if the number of parallel protocol sessions is unbounded [26],
even without any equational theory. In case of a bounded number of sessions, ﬁnding decision
algorithms for proving security against active attacks is still a difﬁcult problem. One important
technique for obtaining such decision procedures is based on the technique of symbolic constraint
solving, where a single constraint expresses that the intruder can deduce a term from some ﬁnite
set of terms. In contrast to the intruder deduction problem considered here, the terms used in the
constraints may contain variables, and we are interested in knowing whether these variables can
be instantiated in such a way that the constraint holds. In the special case where the constraint
does not contain any variables, solving a constraint amounts to solving an intruder deduction
problem.
There are different ways to solve the constraints. One way consists in showing that any solvable
constraint system has a “small solution”. Thus, one obtains a non-deterministic procedure which
guesses a small solution, and then uses a decidability result of the intruder deduction problem in
order to verify that the guess is correct. This is the approach of for instance [15] for the theory of
Difﬁe–Hellman exponentiation with products occurring in exponents, or [13] for the equational
theory of exclusive-or.
Another approach to constraint solving consists in successively simplifying the constraints, pos-
sibly combined with non-deterministic guessing steps [27]. This is the approach of for instance
[12] for the theory of exclusive-or, or of [18] for the theory of exclusive-or with one homomorphism.
In fact, the technical core of the decision procedure for the intruder deduction problem given in
the present paper is a locality result, stating that if the intruder can deduce a certain knowledge w
from an initial knowledge T then there is a deduction using only terms already contained (in a sense
which we will make precise along this paper) in T orw. An important ﬁrst step in solving constraints
consists in lifting this locality lemma to the general case of constraints containing variables, yielding
that if there is a solution to a constraint then there is a “simple” solution (Lemma 2 in [18]), and
that for this simple solution there is a “simple” proof (Lemma 3 in [18]). These lemmas justify a ﬁrst
non-deterministic step in constraints solving which consists in reducing constraints to sequences of
one-step deduction constraints.
1.4. Our contribution
In this paper, we consider protocols that use the Abelian group axioms together with an
encryption algorithm which distributes over the binary operator of an Abelian group denoted
by +, i.e., {x + y}k = {x}k + {y}k . This property is used in several protocols, like for instance
the TMN protocol [28], which use the distributivity of the RSA cryptosystem over the Abeli-
an group operator (see [8] for details). It is related to the homomorphism property h(x + y) =
h(x)+ h(y) if we consider encryption by a ﬁxed key as a homomorphic operator. However,
our theory is more general than the theory of one (or ﬁnitely many) homomorphic operator
since distributivity holds for all keys, that means that we have an inﬁnite number of homo-
morphisms to deal with. Actually, a homomorphism h can be simulated by a public key that
is known by all participants (but where the owner of the associated private key does not play
any role in the protocol).
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We show that the intruder deduction problem for an encryption algorithm which distributes
over the operator of an Abelian group is decidable. Moreover, we give a polynomial complexity
bound in the binary case. Since the theory of homomorphism with Abelian groups is undecidable
for an active intruder [19] and since this theory can be simulated in our framework, our result is the
strongest possible one (with respect to decidability questions). The decision procedure relies ﬁrst
on a careful analysis of the proof system modeling the intruder deduction abilities, allowing us to
state the existence of proofs that have good syntactical properties. This can be seen as the analog
of proof normalization techniques which are widely used in logic to show that proof systems have
good properties (like the subformula property for Gentzen sequent calculus, see e.g. [29]). A second
step is to use algebraic properties of the equational theory to decide the deducibility of a term using
a restricted subset of the rules. This is done easily for the exclusive-or case but it uses more complex
properties of Z-modules for the Abelian group case. Finally, we combine these results to state a
locality theorem generalizing McAllester’s locality method explained in Section 5. For the sake of
simplicity we present our result in the symmetric encryption framework, but it can be lifted to the
public key encryption framework.
The theory of Abelian groups with a distributive encryption cannot be treated by the general
approaches that have been devised so far. The subterm property required in the general approach
of [22] does not hold here since {x}k is not a subterm of {x + y}k , and there is no way to adapt this
technique to our case. Furthermore, the combination result of [24] cannot be used neither since
the theory that we consider cannot be split into disjoint simpler equational theories which is the
starting point in the combination approach, and the ﬁnite variant property required in [25] is not
satisﬁed. Actually, we believe that the theory that we consider falls into a class that requires another
approach than what these works propose.
1.5. Plan of the paper
In the next section, we give an example of a protocol on which there exists a passive attack
exploiting the distributivity of encryption over exclusive-or or an Abelian group operator. We pres-
ent in Section 3 the usual notions needed in the rest of the paper. In Section 4 we introduce the
Dolev–Yao model of intruder capacities extended by a rewrite system modulo AC to model the
distributivity of the encryption symbol over the Abelian group operator. In Section 5 we explain
the generalization of McAllester’s proof technique. In the following sections, we provide the two
main ingredients which allow us to obtain a decision procedure: we show in Section 6 a syntactic
locality result considering the rules of encryption, decryption and addition in a macro rule and we
demonstrate in Sections 7 and 8 the decidability for this macro rule using Z-modules. We sum up
in Section 9 our main results and discuss in Section 10 the restriction to the binary case and give a
decision procedure in PTIME using preﬁx rewrite systems. Finally, we conclude in Section 11.
2. An introductory example
Fig. 1 gives an example of a simple protocol which is designed to distribute a symmetric key K
to two principals A,B using a service provider S . The principals A,B already share a weak secret c
that states their right to share a common symmetric key (for instance, c is some item that proves
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Fig. 1. A protocol for key distribution.
subscription to the service). The value of c is also known to the server. The server has a public key
KS which is known to A and B. In the following, the pair of messagesm,m′ is denoted by 〈m,m′〉 and
the encryption of a message m by a key K is denoted by {m}K . For sake of readability, we denote in
the following example the pair 〈m,m′〉 by m,m′.
The ﬁrst message of A signals to S that she wants to establish a connection with B. The server S
can compute the nonce NA since she can decrypt the message encrypted by KS and subtract A from
this message. The server S then computes c in the same way. Then, S informs B that A wants to
start the protocol with him, and a similar connection is established with B allowing S to check that
A and B both know c and are hence allowed get the same symmetric key K . Then, the server sends
the key K to A, using the Vernam encryption scheme with {NA}KS to protect the key. The agent A
can compute {NA}KS and retrieve K . The use of the nonce NA provides a (weak) authentication in
this last step. The agent B performs the same operation and obtains the same key K . A property of
the protocol is that all encryptions by KS use different terms, which is useful in preventing replay
attacks.
The question of whether there exists an attack (passive or active) against this protocol depends
on the algebraic theory taken into account. First, we have checked with the AVISPA tool that there
exists no active attack against this protocol for three principals A,B,C and two parallel sessions
without any equational theory. This means in particular that there exists no passive attack against
the protocol in the empty equational theory.
Second, we have used the tools OFMC [30] and Cl-Atse [31] from the AVISPA project in order
to check for existence of active attacks when taking into account the algebraic theory of exclusive-
or. For this equational theory, there still is no active attack in the sense that the intruder cannot
obtain the secret key K generated by the server. As a consequence, there is no passive attack for the
equational theory of exclusive-or.
However, there is a (passive) attack if we take into account the full equational theory of
exclusive-or with distributive encryption, and also for the equational theory of Abelian groups
with distribute encryption. The attack goes as follows. By intercepting the ﬁrst message, the in-
truder can compute {NA}KS using the distributivity of encryption since A is public, hence {A}KS is
too. Therefore, the intruder can retrieve K from the last message by subtracting {NA}KS from it.
If we modify the protocol by distributing all encryptions over +, for instance replacing the term
{A+ NA}KS by {A}KS + {NA}KS , then the tools OFMC and Cl-Atse ﬁnd the passive attack described
previously.
The results of this paper allow to detect these attacks automatically on the unmodiﬁed proto-
col.
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3. Preliminaries
We summarize some basic notations used in this paper, see [32,33] for an overview of rewriting.
Let  be a signature. T(,X) denotes the set of terms over the signature  and the set of variables
X , that is the smallest set such that:
(1) X ⊆ T(,X);
(2) if t1, . . . , tn ∈ T(,X), and f ∈  has arity n ≥ 0, then f(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T(,X).
We abbreviate T(,∅) as T(); elements of T() are called -ground terms. The set of variables
occurring in a term t is denoted by V(t).
The set of occurrences of a term t is deﬁned recursively as O(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = {} ∪⋃i=1...n i · O(ti).
For instance, O(f(a, g(b, x))) = {, 1, 2, 21, 22}. The size |t| of a term t is deﬁned as its number
of occurrences, that is |t| = cardinality (O(t)). We extend the notion of size to a set of terms T
by |T | = t∈T |T |. If o ∈ O(t) then the subterm of t at position o is deﬁned recursively by:
• t |= t
• f(t1, . . . , tn) |j·o= tj |o
We call a term r a subterm of a term t if r is a subterm of t at some position of t. If t and s are terms
and o ∈ O(t) then the grafting of s onto t at position o is deﬁned recursively as:
• t[ ← s] = s
• f(t1, . . . , tn)[j · o ← s] = f(t1, . . . , tj−1, tj[o ← s], tj+1, . . . , tn)
For instance, f(a, g(b, x))[22 ← h(c)] = f(a, g(b, h(c))).
A -equation is a pair (l, r) ∈ T(,X), commonly written as l = r. The relation =E generated by
a set of  equations E is the smallest congruence on T() that contains all ground instances of all
equations in E.
A -rewriting system R is a ﬁnite set of so-called rewriting rules l → r where l ∈ T(,X) and
r ∈ T(,V(l)). A term t ∈ T(,X) rewrites to s in one step by R if there is a rewriting rule l → r in
R, an occurrence o and a substitution  such that t |o= l and s = t[o ← r]. If the occurrence o is
the empty string, that is if rewriting takes places at the root of the tree, then t preﬁx-rewrites in one
step to s, written t → s. We write →∗ for the reﬂexive and transitive closure of →, and →∗ for the
reﬂexive and transitive closure of →. A term t is in normal form if there is no term s with t → s. If
t →∗ s and s is a normal form then we say that s is a normal form of t, and write s = t ↓.
A term rewriting system is called convergent if it is
• strongly terminating, that is if there is no inﬁnite sequence of the form t1 → t2 → t3 → · · ·.
• locally conﬂuent, that is if t → s1 and t → s2 then there exists a term r with s1 →∗ r and s2 →∗ r.
By a well-known result (see, e.g. [32]), every convergent rewrite system is conﬂuent, that is if t →∗ s1
and t →∗ s2 then there exists a term r with s1 →∗ r and s2 →∗ r. As a consequence, in a convergent
rewrite system every term has a unique normal form.
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By R/S we denote the so-called class rewrite system composed of a set R = {li → ri} of rewrite
rules and a set S of equations. Generalizing the notion of term rewriting, we say that s rewrites to t
modulo S , denoted s →R/S t, if s =S u[l]p and u[r]p =S t, for some context u, position p in u, rule
l → r in R, and substitution .
Let T be a set of terms, the mapping S : T → T is idempotent if for every X ⊆ T : S(S(X)) = S(X).
The mapping S is monotone if for all X , Y ⊆ T : if X ⊆ Y then S(X) ⊆ S(Y). S is transitive if for all
X , Y ,Z ⊆ T , X ⊆ S(Y) and Y ⊆ S(Z) implies X ⊆ S(Z).
Proposition 1. Let S be a mapping from sets of terms to sets of terms. If the mapping S is idempotent
and monotone then it is transitive.
Proof. straightforward. 
4. Our model
We use the classic model of deduction rules [7] introduced by Dolev and Yao in order to model
the deductive capacities of a passive intruder. We present here an extension of this model which
takes into account an equational theory.
4.1. Equational theory
We consider the equational theory where encryption, denoted by {.}., distributes over the binary
operator of an Abelian group. The Abelian group is modeled by the operator +, a neutral element
0 and the inversion operator −.
The equational theory E consists of the following axioms:
(x + y)+ z = x + (y + z) Associativity
x + y = y + x Commutativity
x + 0 = x Neutral element
x + (−x) = 0 Inversion
{x + y}k = {x}k + {y}k Distributivity 1
{−x}k = −{x}k Distributivity 2
This equational theory is represented by a convergent rewrite systemRmoduloAC, that isR is ter-
minating and conﬂuent modulo associativity and commutativity of +, and for all terms t, s ∈ T()
we have that t =E s if and only if t ↓R/AC =AC s↓R/AC . Note that {0}z = 0 is a consequence of the
equational axioms. The convergent rewrite system R consists of the following rules:
x + 0 → x
x + (−x) → 0
−0 → 0
−(−x) → x
−(x + y) → (−x)+ (−y)
{x + y}z → {x}z + {y}z
{−x}k → −{x}k
{0}z → 0
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Fig. 2. A Dolev–Yao proof system working on normal forms by the rewrite system R modulo AC.
The complete signature is  = {〈·, ·〉, {·}·, 0,+,−} unionmulti 0, where 0 is a set of free constant symbols.
The symbols not pertaining to the Abelian group come from the Dolev–Yao model. The ﬁrst one
〈·, ·〉 is used to build a pair of two messages and the second one {·}· is used to encrypt a message by
a key. For the sake of simplicity we here only consider symmetric encryption.
This equational theory can be extended to model the exclusive-or operation by adding the
axioms2
(−x) = x
x + x = 0
which are oriented as rewrite rules
(−x) → x
x + x → 0
to get a convergent rewrite system R modulo AC.
In the rest of the paper, we use an abbreviation for sums of terms in Abelian groups: given an
integer  ∈ Z and a term t, we denote by t the sum of  times the term t if  ≥ 0, and the sum of
|| times the term −t when  < 0.
4.2. An extended Dolev–Yao model for our equational theory
We assume that the intruder can exploit the equational theory given above to mount an attack.
The knowledge of the intruder is represented by terms built over the signature  deﬁned previously.
Let T be a ﬁnite set of ground terms and u be a ground term, a sequent T  u denotes the fact
that the intruder can deduce u from the initial knowledge T . The deduction system describing the
deductive capacities of an intruder is given in Fig. 2.
This deduction system is composed of the following rules: (A) the intruder may use any term
which is in his initial knowledge, (P) the intruder can build a pair of two messages, (UL) and (UR)
he can extract each member of a pair, (C) he can encrypt a message uwith a key v, (D) if he knows a
2 The second axiom is a logical consequence of the other axioms but it is convenient to have the associated rewrite rule.
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key v he can decrypt a message encrypted by v. Sometimes, we shall annotate the rules (C) and (D)
by the key that they use, yielding rules (Cv) and (Dv). Finally, there is a family (GX) of rules which
allow the intruder to construct a sum of terms, possibly using the same term several times.
Note that for all sequents T  u derivable by the inference system the term u is in normal form by
the rewrite system R/AC . This is obvious for the rule (A) by deﬁnition. For the rules (UL), (UR) and
(P) it holds by induction since the rewrite system does not concern the pairing symbol. The rules
(C), (GX) and (D) explicitly state normalization of the resulting term. An example of an instance of
rule (D) is
(D)
T  2{a}k + 3{{b}l}k T  k
2a+ 3{b}l
since 2{a}k + 3{{b}l}k is the normal form of {2a+ 3{b}l}k .
It is easy to see that this deductive system is equivalent in deductive power to a variant of the
system in which terms are not automatically normalized, but in which arbitrary equational proofs
are allowed at any moment of the deduction. The equivalence of the two proof systems has been
shown in [16] without AC axioms; in [34] this has been extended to the case of a rewrite system
modulo AC.
From now on we will omit the index R/AC and write ↓. We assume that the set T consists only
of terms in normal form.
In the case of exclusive-or, the same deduction system works, but we may assume that all terms ui
in the premises of the (GX) rule are different and that all coefﬁcients i in the conclusion are equal
to 1.
5. Generalization of locality and complexity of the intruder deduction problem
Our starting point is the locality technique introduced byMcAllester [35]. He considers deduction
systems that are represented by ﬁnite sets of Horn clauses. He shows that there exists a polynomi-
al-time algorithm to decide the deducibility of a term w from a ﬁnite set of terms T if the deduction
system has the so-called locality property. A deduction system has the locality property if any proof
can be transformed into a local proof, that is a proof where all nodes are syntactic subterms of
T ∪ {w}. The idea of the proof is to check existence of a local proof by a saturation algorithm which
computes all syntactic subterms of T ∪ {w} that are deducible from T.
An abstract version of this algorithm is presented in Fig. 3 where S is a function which maps any
set of terms to its set of subterms (the set of syntactic subterms in McAllester’s original algorithm).
In this algorithm we denote the one-step deduction relation by =1, where we say that w is one-step
deducible from T if we can obtain w from T with only one application of a rule of the proof system.
There are two main restrictions in McAllester’s approach: the deduction system must be ﬁnite
and the notion of locality is restricted to syntactic subterms. These restrictions raise a serious prob-
lem when we are working modulo AC, as it is already pointed out in [12]. Therefore we use a rule
(GX) with an arbitrary number of hypotheses because we need to collapse several applications of
this rule into a single one to establish commutation properties. However, we are now stuck with an
inﬁnite number of rules. Fortunately, we can implement the test of one-step deducibility in the loop
of McAllester’s algorithm in a clever way that allows us to get a more efﬁcient procedure.
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Fig. 3. Checking existence of an S-local proof.
In the rest of the paper we denote T ∪ {w} by T ,w.
Deﬁnition 1. Let S be a function which maps a set of terms to a set of terms. A proof P of T  w is
S-local if all nodes are labeled by some T  vwith v ∈ S(T ,w). A proof system is S-local if whenever
there is a proof of T  w then there also is an S-local proof of T  w.
The following theorem generalizes McAllester’s result.
Theorem 1. Let S be a function mapping a set of terms to a set of terms, and P a proof system. Let T
be a set of terms, let w be a term and let n be |T ,w|. If:
(1) one-step deducibility of S =1 u in P is decidable in time g(|S , u|) for any term u and set of terms
S ,
(2) the set S(T ,w) can be constructed in time f(n),
(3) P is S-local,
then provability of T  w in the proof system P is decidable in time f(n)+ f(n) ∗ f(n) ∗ g(f(n)) (non-
deterministic if one of (2), (1) is non-deterministic).
Proof.By S-locality of the proof system, provability of T  w is equivalent to existence of an S-local
proof for T  w. Existence of an S-local proof of T  w is checked by the algorithm of Fig. 3, and
the computation of Sub takes time f(n). As a consequence, the cardinality of Sub is bounded by
f(n). Hence, the number of iterations of the outer loop is bounded by f(n), and for each iteration
of the outer loop the number of iterations of the inner loop is also bounded by f(n). Since the size
of T is bounded by f(n) the conditional instruction can be performed in time g(f(n)). 
Therefore the road map to prove deducibility in our more general setting is:
(i) show that one-step deducibility can be tested in time g(n), for some complexity measure g,
(ii) deﬁne a notion of subterms which can be computed in time f(n), for some complexity measure
f ,
(iii) show locality with respect to this notion of subterms.
We ﬁrst notice that one-step deducibility is decidable in polynomial time for all the rules except
the rule (GX), since these rules have a ﬁxed, bounded number of hypotheses. One-step deducibility
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of the rule (GX) for the equational theory of exclusive-or and Abelian group with a distributive
encryption is analyzed in Section 8.
In Section 6, we adapt the deﬁnition of syntactic subterms to our case (Deﬁnition 3) andwe estab-
lish several properties of the proof system that allow us to get a locality result for a modiﬁed system
consisting of the rules (A), (UR), (UL), (P) and (GXCD), the last one representing combinations of
the (GX), (C), (D) rules (Section 7). The applicability of this last rule is established in Section 8. All
these results yield the decidability of the intruder deduction problem for the case of exclusive-orwith
distributive encryption and for the case of Abelian groups with distributive encryption (Section 9).
In Section 10 we shall deﬁne a polynomial notion of subterms in the binary case, which allows us
to get a polynomial-time complexity in this case.
6. Syntactic locality
We ﬁrst deﬁne the notion of syntactic subterms. Second we characterize the kind of proofs which
allows us to demonstrate some technical lemmas. Finally we prove in Lemma 5 a partial locality
result for a modiﬁed proof system called SGXCD.
6.1. Subterms
We need ﬁrst to characterize when a term is a sum of terms or a negative term.
Deﬁnition 2. Let u be a term in normal form, u is headed with + if u is of the form u1 + · · · + un with
n > 1. Otherwise u is not headed with +. Let u be a term in normal form, u is headed with − if u is of
the form −v where v is a term not headed with +. Otherwise u is not headed with −.
Example 1. t1 = −2u+ 3〈v,w〉 is headedwith+ and not headedwith−, and t2 = {〈3v,w〉}k is headed
neither with + nor with −. Notice that according to our notations −3u = (−u)+ (−u)+ (−u) is
headed with + and that −a is headed with − and not with +.
We deﬁne a notion of syntactic subterms.
Deﬁnition 3. The set of syntactic subterms of a term t in normal form is the smallest set S(t) such
that:
• t ∈ S(t).
• If 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(t) then u, v ∈ S(t).
• If {u}v ∈ S(t) then u, v ∈ S(t).
• If u = u1 + · · · + un + (−un+1)+ · · · + (−un+m) ∈ S(t) and ui not headed with + and not headed
with − then S(ui) ⊆ S(t).
S is extended to a set T of terms in normal form by S(T) :=⋃t∈T S(t).
Example 2. For t = 2a+ 〈3b+ c, d〉 we have that
S(t) = {t, a, 〈3b+ c, d〉, 3b+ c, b, c, d}
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Note that, by our deﬁnition, 2a and 3b are no syntactic subterms of t.
We demonstrate some properties of the syntactic subterms which will be used implicitly many
times in the rest of the paper.
Proposition 2. Let A and B be two sets of terms in normal form, the mapping S of syntactic subterms
has the following properties:
• S(A ∪ B) = S(A) ∪ S(B).
• S is idempotent : S(S(A)) = S(A).
• S is monotone : if A ⊆ B then S(A) ⊆ S(B).
• S is transitive.
Proof. These properties are consequences of Deﬁnition 3 of syntactic subterms and
Proposition 1. 
Example 3 below demonstrates that the notion of syntactic subterm is not sufﬁcient to get the
locality result. In this example, the ﬁrst proof applies the rule (GX) only once in the end, while in the
second proof “partial sums” are formed as early as possible. With this latter kind of proof, which
we will formally deﬁne in the next section, we can limit the number of encryption symbols used in
the terms of the proof. This point is an important ingredient of our approach to demonstrate the
decidability of the intruder deduction problem.
Example 3.Consider the following proof with T = {a− {b}k , {b}k − c, {c}k − d , k} andw = {a}k − d
where 0 = {a, b, c, d , k}. We compute
S(T ,w) = T ∪ {w} ∪ {{a}k , a, {b}k , b, {c}k , c, d , k}
This proof of T  w is not S-local since {{b}k}k is not in S(T ,w).
In this second proof of T  w, the term a− c is not in S(T ,w), hence this proof is not S-local.
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Fig. 4. Transformation of (GX)–(GX) into (GX).
6.2. Minimal, simple and ﬂat proofs
We deﬁne several notions on proofs that we use in the remainder of the paper.
Deﬁnition 4. Let P be a proof of T  w.
• A subproof P ′ of P is a subtree of P .
• The size of a proof P , denoted by |P |, is the number of nodes in P .
• A proof P of T  w is minimal if for all proofs P ′ of T  w: |P | ≤ |P ′|.
• The proof P is simple if each node T  v occurs at most once on each branch and a node T  v
occurs in every instance of (GX) at most once as hypothesis of the rule (GX).
• The proof P is ﬂat if there is no (GX) rule immediately above another (GX) rule.
Since two successive (GX) rules can be merged into a single (GX) rule, each proof can be trans-
formed into an equivalent ﬂat proof as it is described in Fig. 4.
To get a simple proof, we eliminate the part of the proof between two occurrences of the same
node in abranch and in the hypothesis of a rule (GX). This simpliﬁcation terminates since it decreases
|P |.
Proposition 3. Let P be a simple proof then:
(1) there is no rule (Dv) just after a rule (Cv) in P.
(2) there is no rule (Cv) just after a rule (Dv) in P.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of the simplicity. 
Proposition 4. Let P be a proof of T  w.
• If P is minimal then P is ﬂat.
• If P is minimal then P is simple.
Proof. If the proof P of T  w is not ﬂat then the proof is not minimal since we can merge
two rule (GX) and obtain a smaller proof. Similarly, if a proof P of T  w is not simple then the
proof is not minimal since we can cut the loop in the proof and construct a smaller
proof. 
These two propositions will be used implicitly in the rest of the paper.
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6.3. Technical lemmas
We demonstrate a technical lemma used in the proof of Lemma 3. Then we prove Lemma 3.




P1 . . . Pn
T  w
If T  u does not occur in any of P1, . . . , Pn and 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(w) then there is at least one i such that
〈u, v〉 ∈ S(wi), where the root of Pi is one of T  wi or wi ∈ T.
Proof. We consider all possible rules for the last rule (R) of P :
• The last rule is (A): obvious
• The last rule is (UL) or (UR): in this case we have n = 1 and w1 = 〈u1, u2〉 where w is one of u1 or
u2. We conclude by induction hypothesis since 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(w) ⊆ S(w1).
• The last rule is (D): in this case we have n = 2 and w1 = {w}w2 . We conclude by induction hy-
pothesis since 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(w) ⊆ S(w1).
• The last rule is (GX): 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(w) by hypothesis and w = (w1 + . . .+ wn)↓. Hence by deﬁnition
of the subterm relation 〈u, v〉 ∈ ∪iS(wi), more precisely there exists i such that 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(wi), since
〈u, v〉 is not headed with +. We conclude with the induction hypothesis.
• The last rule is (P): since T  w cannot occur in P by simplicity of the proof P , we have that
w = 〈w1,w2〉 /= 〈u, v〉. Since 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(w) by hypothesis we obtain that 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(w1) ∪ S(w2) and
we conclude with the induction hypothesis.
• The last rule is (C): we have n = 2 and w = {w1}w2 . Since 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(w) by hypothesis we obtain
that 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(w1) ∪ S(w2) and we conclude with the induction hypothesis. 
Lemma 3. Let P be a simple proof of T  u. If P is one of
then 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(T).
Proof. Let us assume that the last rule is (UL), the case (UR) is similar.
P is simple so T  u does not occur in any of P1, . . . , Pn. Hence, we can apply Lemma 2 to P1...PnT〈u,v〉 .
Either 〈u, v〉 ∈ T , or there is some Pi with root T  w such that 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(w) and T  u does not
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occur in Pi . Lemma 2 can be applied again and the iteration of this reasoning ﬁnally leads to 〈u, v〉
∈ T . 
Lemma 4. Let P be a minimal proof of T  w. If the proof P contains a rule of pairing (P) of the
following form:
then 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(T ,w).
Proof. We prove the result by structural induction on the the proof P of T  w. There are different
cases according to the last rule of the proof P :
• The last rule is (A). This case is trivial.
• The last rule is (UR) or (UL).
By induction hypothesis we know that all terms generated by a rule (P) in the proof P1 are
in S(T , 〈w, v〉). Since a minimal proof is simple we obtain by Lemma 3 that 〈w, v〉 ∈ S(T). As a
consequence, all terms generated by a rule (P) are in S(T) ⊆ S(T ,w).
• The last rule is (C).
By induction hypothesis we know that all terms generated by a rule (P) are in S(T , u) for the
subproof P1 and that all the pairs generated by a rule (P) are in S(T , k) for the subproof P2. By
deﬁnitionof S wehave that u ∈ S({u}k) = S(w) and k ∈ S({u}k) = S(w). Hence, all terms generated
by a rule (P) in the proof P are in S(T ,w).
• The last rule is (P). The claim is obviously true for the occurrence of (P) which is at the root of
the proof P . The rest of the demonstration is similar to the previous case with rule (C).
By induction hypothesis we know that all terms generated by a rule (P) are in S(T , u) for the
subproof P1 and that all the pairs generated by a rule (P) are in S(T , v) for the subproof P2.
By deﬁnition of S we have that u ∈ S(〈u, v〉) = S(w) and v ∈ S(〈u, v〉) = S(w). Hence, all terms
generated by a rule (P) in the proof P are in S(T ,w).
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• The last rule is (GX).
Consider an occurrence of rule (P) yielding some term v = 〈v1, v2〉 in some subproof Pi . By induc-
tion hypothesis, v ∈ S(T , ui). Assume that v ∈ S(T ,w). This implies that v ∈ S(T), hence v ∈ S(ui).
By consequence, this occurrence of v is “canceled out” in the sum, that is we have that v ∈ S(uj) for
some j /= i. We can now obtain a smaller proof of T  w as follows: We ascend in both subproofs
Pi and Pj the maximal paths of nodes from ui, respectively, uj on which the nodes contain v as
a subterm. Either one of the paths ends in an application of rule (A), in which case we conclude
that v ∈ S(T) in contradiction to the hypothesis v ∈ S(T ,w). Otherwise all these paths end in an
application of rule (P). In this case we replace this application of rule (P) by the subproof leading
to T  v1, we cut the subproof of v2, and in all nodes on the two paths we replace the subterm v
by v1. This yields a smaller proof, in contradiction to the minimality of the proof.
• The last rule is (D).
We use a similar reasoning as in the previous case for the rule (GX). Consider an occurrence of
rule (P) yielding some term v = 〈v1, v2〉 in some subproof Pi, and assume that v ∈ S(T ,w).
If the application of (P) occurs in P1, we get v ∈ S(T , {w}k) by induction hypothesis, hence v ∈
S(T , k) since we assumed that v ∈ S(T ,w) and a pair cannot be an encrypted term. If the applica-
tion of (P) occurs in P2 we get that v ∈ S(T , k) by induction hypothesis.
We show how to get a smaller proof of T  w. We consider the maximal subpaths of the proof
P such that all nodes of the path are labeled by a term T  u such that v = 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ ST(u). The
rule corresponding to the ending node of these path cannot be (A), otherwise we get v ∈ ST(T)
which is not possible since we assume that v ∈ S(T ,w). Therefore the rule labeling these nodes is
(P). Let us consider the new tree obtained by replacing each subtree
and every occurrence of v under this node by v1. A straightforward induction on the structure
of proofs shows that these rewriting process still yields a valid proof of T  w. By deﬁnition this
proof is smaller than the initial one, which contradicts the minimality assumption. 
6.4. Partial locality result
We now prove Lemma 5which states a locality property of a variant of the proof system: we con-
sider all successive applications of the rules (GX), (C) and (D) as a “macro” rule denoted (GXCD).
This rule takes as hypotheses all the hypotheses of the rules (GX), (C) and (D) and yields the result
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of all these rules. In this proof system, called SGXCD, we only have the rules of (A), (UR), (UL), (P)
and (GXCD).
Lemma 5. Let P be a proof of T  w in SGXCD, then there exists a proof P ′ of T  w in SGXCD such
that all the nodes of P ′ are in S(T ,w).
Proof. Let P be a proof of T  w in SGXCD, we consider a proof of T  w in the initial system which
exists by construction of the rule (GXCD). We construct from this proof the minimal proof of T  w
in the initial system. By Lemma 2 and 4, all nodes resulting from a rule (UR), (UL) or (P) are in
S(T ,w). We reconstruct with this proof a proof in SGXCD, we obtain that:
• All nodes which are hypotheses or conclusion of a rule (UR), (UL) or (P) are in S(T ,w).
• All hypothesis of all the rules (GXCD) stem from T or from a rule (UR), (UL) or (P), and by
consequence are in S(T ,w).
• All conclusions of all the rules (GXCD) are either an hypothesis of one rule (UR), (UL) or (P), or
it is w, and by consequence are in S(T ,w).
We conclude that all nodes of this new proof of T  w in SGXCD are in S(T ,w). 
All the proofs of all the lemmas of this section carry over to the exclusive-or case without any
modiﬁcation.
7. Elementary provability
By Theorem 1 and Lemma 5 we have now to show that one-step deducibility by the “macro
rule” (GXCD) is decidable. The goal of the present section is to show that it is sufﬁcient to search
for a (GXCD) proof such that its expansion into single steps (GX), (C) and (D) has the following
properties:
• All nodes are in a particular form (Lemma 8).
• All keys used as hypothesis of a rule (C) or (D) are hypotheses to the macro rule (Lemma 9).
We will show in Section 8 that existence of such a restricted (GXCD) proof is decidable.
7.1. Deﬁnitions
We deﬁne ﬁrst an important notion of atom of a term in normal form.
Deﬁnition 5. The set of atoms of a term t in normal form is deﬁned by
• atoms(t1 + t2) = atoms(t1) ∪ atoms(t2)
• atoms(−t) = atoms(t)
• atoms({t1}t2) = {{t1}t2} ∪ atoms(t1) ∪ atoms(t2)• atoms(t) = {t} if t is not headed with + and not headed with −.
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We write atoms(T) for
⋃
t∈T atoms(t), and atoms(T , t) for atoms(T ∪ {t}).
Proposition 5. For every term t, atoms(t) ⊆ S(t).
Proposition 6. Let atoms(t) = {a1, . . . , an}. Then there exist 1, . . . ,n ∈ Z \ {0} such that
t =∑i=ni=1 iai.
Proof. These two properties are consequences of Deﬁnition 3 of syntactic subterms and the Deﬁni-
tion 5 of atoms. 
Obviously there is an instance of the macro rule (GXCD)
(GXCD)
T  t1 . . . T  tn
T  t
if and only if there exists a proof of T  t using only the rules (A), (GX), (C) and (D).
Deﬁnition 6. A proof of T  w using only (A), (C), (D) and (GX) is called elementary if for each
node T  u we have that atoms(u) ⊆ atoms(T ,w).
Our goal in this section is to show that whenever there is a proof of T  w using the rules (A),
(C), (D) and (GX) then there is an elementary proof of T  w.
The following notion is central in establishing the main result of this section. Intuitively, in a
+-eager proof the (GX) rule is applied as early as possible.
Deﬁnition 7. Let P be a ﬂat proof of T  w. P is a +-eager proof if
(1) for every v there is at most one rule (Cv) with the key v immediately above a (GX) in P ,
(2) and there is no rule (Dv) just after a (GX) with a rule (Cv) just above (GX).
Example 4. We consider the two proofs of T  w given in Example 3. The ﬁrst proof presented is
simple but not +-eager since there are two rules (Ck) above a rule (GX), while the second one is
+-eager and simple.
We will prove in Lemma 8 that every simple and +-eager proof is elementary.
7.2. Proof transformations and technical lemmas
Now we present some transformations on proofs used to demonstrate that every proof can be
transformed into an elementary one.
Proposition 7. All the transformations of proofs given in Figs. 4–6 decrease the number of nodes.
Proof. We denote by x the subproof of P with root T  x. Observe ﬁrst that all the transformations
transform a proof with some hypotheses and a conclusion into a proof with the same hypotheses
and the same conclusion.
In Fig. 4 it is obvious.
In Fig. 5 the number of nodes of the initial proof is i=mi=1 |zi | + i=ni=1 |xi | + n|v| + n+ 1 and the
ﬁnal proof contains i=mi=1 |zi | + i=ni=1 |xi | + |v| + 3 nodes, which is less since n ≥ 2.
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Fig. 5. Transformation of (Cv)–(GX) into (GX)–(Cv), where n ≥ 2 and all (Ri) are different from (Cv).
Fig. 6. Elimination of a rule (Dv) after a (GX) with a rule (Cv) just above the (GX) (Ck)–(GX)–(Dk), with n ≥ 2.
In Fig. 6, we decompose the message {u}v into two parts {u}v = {c}v + {B}v, where the term {c}v
represents the sum of all terms that compose the term {u}v except the term B just encrypted by
the key v. Using this decomposition, we can apply the decryption rule earlier, and obtain a new
proof of T  u. Hence, the ﬁrst proof has i=ni=1 |B′i | + |B| + 2|v| + 3 nodes and the last proof has
i=ni=1 |B′i | + |B| + |v| + 3 nodes. We deduce that the number of nodes decreases. 
Lemma 6. If there is a proof of T  w then there is also a +-eager and simple proof of T  w.
Proof. Let P be a proof of T  w. The transformation rules given in Figs. 4–6 decrease |P | as well
as the transformation to get a simple rule. Therefore the application of rules eventually terminates
with a +-eager simple proof of T  w. 
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Lemma 7. Let P be a +-eager and simple proof of T  u of the form
Then atoms({u}v) ⊆ atoms(T).
Proof. The proof is by structural induction on P .
Base case: obvious.
Induction step: we perform a case analysis on the last rule (R) used in the subproof of P with
root {u}v ↓.
• (R) is (A): the result is true by deﬁnition of the rule (A).
• (R) is some rule (C): this cannot happen since either (C) is (Cv) and P is not simple or (C) is (Cv′)
and {u}v = {u′}v′ with v /= v′ which is impossible.
• (R) is some rule (D) s.t. T{{u}v}v′Tv′T{u}v . Then by induction hypothesis atoms({{u}v}v′) ⊆ atoms(T),
yielding by deﬁnition of atoms that atoms({u}v) ⊆ atoms(T).
• (R) is (GX). The last deductions in the proof P are described in Fig. 7 andwe consider the different
cases according to the rules (Ri) and to the structure of {u}v ↓.
We will show that every atom of {u}v ↓ is in fact an element of atoms(T). Let a ∈ atoms({u}v ↓).
Note that a is necessarily of the form {a′}v, and that there is an i such that a ∈ atoms(ui). We
consider different possible cases for the rule (Ri):
• (Ri) is (A), hence a ∈ atoms(T).
• (Ri) is (Dv′) s.t. (Dv′)T{w1}v′Tv
′
Tw1=ui .
By induction hypothesis atoms({w1}v′) ⊆ atoms(T), therefore by deﬁnition of atoms we con-
clude that atoms(ui) ⊆ atoms(T) and a ∈ atoms(T).
• (Ri) is (Cv) or (GX): impossible since the proof is +-eager and ﬂat.
• (Ri) is (Cv′) with v /= v′. Then ui = {u′}v′ ↓. Since v′ /= v none of atoms({u′}v′ ↓) can be equal
to a, all these atoms are canceled out by other occurrences of the same atom in one of the uj
with j /= i. Since the proof is +-eager and ﬂat it is impossible that the other terms stem from
the rule (GX) or the rule (C), consequently the other terms stem only from a rule (A) or (D).
In the ﬁrst case atoms are obviously in atoms(T), in the second case we apply the induction
hypothesis. We conclude that atoms(ui) ⊆ atoms(T). 
Fig. 7. Illustration of the case (D) in Lemma 7.
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7.3. Elementary proofs
Now we have all ingredients to demonstrate the existence of an elementary proof, and as con-
sequence we prove some lemmas on the keys used in the proof which will be employed in the next
section.
Lemma 8. Every simple and +-eager proof is elementary.
Proof. We proceed by structural induction on the proof P and case distinction of the last rule (R)
of P a simple and +-eager proof of T  u:
• (R) is (A): P is obviously an elementary proof.
• (R) is some rule (D) s.t. T{u}vTvTu . The induction hypothesis yields that the proof P1 which yields
T  {u}v and the proof P2 which yields T  v are elementary, that is that for all nodes T  w in P1,
respectively, P2, we have that atoms(w) ⊆ atoms(T , {u}v), respectively, atoms(w) ⊆ atoms(T , v).
Since P is +-eager we obtain with Lemma 7 that atoms({u}v) ⊆ atoms(T) ⊆ atoms(T ,w). We
conclude that atoms(w) ⊆ atoms(T , u) for all T  w in P .
• (R) is some rule (C): we have that u = {u1}u2 . (R) is some (C) s.t. Tu1Tu2T{u1}u2 . The induction hypothe-
sis yields that the proof P1 which yields T  u and the proof P2 which yields T  v are elementary,
that is that for all nodes T  w in P1, respectively, P2, we have that atoms(w) ⊆ atoms(T , u1), re-
spectively, atoms(w) ⊆ atoms(u2). We conclude by the fact that atoms(T , u1) ⊆ atoms(T , {u1}u2)
and atoms(T , u2) ⊆ atoms(T , {u1}u2).• (R) is some rule (GX) such that
By induction hypothesis, each of the proofs Pi yielding T  ui is elementary, that is for each T  w
in Pi we have that atoms(w) ⊆ atoms(T , ui). In order to conclude we will show that atoms(ui) ⊆
atoms(T , u) for every i. We proceed by case distinction on the last rule (Ri) of the proof Pi .
• (Ri) is (GX): impossible since P is +-eager, hence ﬂat.
• (Ri) is (A), (D): by Lemma 7, atoms(ui) ⊆ atoms(T) ⊆ atoms(T , u).
• (Ri) is (Ck ): let a ∈ atoms(ui), and assume that a ∈ atoms(T , u). Since ui is obtained by appli-
cation of rule (Ck ) we have that a is of the form {a′}k .
Since a ∈ atoms(u) it must be the case that a is “canceled out” by some other term uj , j /= i,
with a ∈ atoms(uj). Since we assumed that a ∈ atoms(T) we conclude as above that the last
rule (Rj) of the proof Pj cannot be (A), (D), or (C). Hence, Rj is some rule (C), and by the fact
that a = {a′}k we obtain that Rj is (Ck). This means that we have two distinct applications of
(Ck) above (GX), which contradicts the assumption that P is +-eager. 
Deﬁnition 8. A term v is in key position of a term in normal form w if {t}v ∈ S(w) for some term t.
Lemma 9. Let P be a +-eager and simple proof of T  w. All terms occurring in key position of some
node of P are in S(T ,w).
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Proof. If a term k appears in key position of a term t occurring in the proof P then it is syntactic
subterm of an atom of t, and hence by Lemma 8 a subterm of some atom of T ,w. By Proposition 5
we obtain k ∈ S(T ,w). 
Lemma 9 allows us to obtain a reﬁned version of the locality theorem obtained above: not only
do we obtain locality when we cluster successive applications of (GX), (C) and (D), but we even
have locality for the following reﬁned “macro” rule.
Deﬁnition 9. A proof tree P is a GCD-proof tree with set of leaves L, set of keys K , and root u in any
of the following cases:
(1) P consists of a single node T  u and L = {u}, K = ∅,
(2) or P is of the form (C) P TkTu where P is a GCD proof tree with root u
′, leaves L and set of keys
K ′, K = K ′ ∪ {k}, and {u′}k ↓ = u,
(3) or P is of the form (D) P TkTu where P is a GCD proof tree with root u
′, leaves L and set of keys
K ′, K = K ′ ∪ {k}, and {u}k ↓ = u′,
(4) or P consists of (GX) P1 ··· Pnu with n ≥ 1 such that every Pi is a GCD-proof tree with
respective leaves Li, root u1, and set of keys Ki, and K =⋃ni=1 Ki ∪ K ′ and
L =⋃ni=1 Li .
In particular, any instance of one of the rules (GX), (C), or (D) is a GCD-proof tree.
Again, the reasoning performed in this section applies also to the case of the
exclusive-or.
8. Deciding GCD-deducibility in the general case
Our goal in this section is to decide elementary deducibility.
Deﬁnition 10. We say that a term w is elementary deducible from a ﬁnite set L of terms if there exists
a GCD-proof tree with set of leaves L′ ⊆ L, set of keysK ⊆ L, and rootw, and such that for all nodes
T  t of the proof we have that atoms(t) ⊆ atoms(L,w).
We ﬁrst demonstrate the exclusive-or case which is an immediate consequence of the result on
elementary proofs. Second we decide elementary deducibility for the more complex case of Abelian
group using the mathematical notion of Z-module.
8.1. The exclusive-or case
This case is easy: by deﬁnition, the nodes of the GCD-proof trees have the form a1 + · · · + an
where ai ∈ atoms(L,w) and ai /= aj for i /= j. Therefore, there are only exponentially (in the size
of |L| + |w|) many possible nodes, hence only a ﬁnite number of possible proofs. The one-step de-
ducibility for the rule (GX) in this case is equivalent to solving linear Diophantine equations over
Z/2Z. This approach is similar to the method used by [12,13] to prove one-step deducibility by the
rule (GX).
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8.2. The Abelian group case
The above reasoning does not apply in the Abelian group case since there is no a priori bound
on the coefﬁcients of a sum i=ni=1iai . Let
atoms(L,w) = {a1, . . . , an}
We call an (L,w)-elementary term a term t such that atoms(t) ⊆ atoms(L,w). By Proposition 6 an
(L,w)-elementary term t can be written in the form 1a1 + · · · + nan with i ∈ Z. We deﬁne the
representation of t as t = (1, . . . ,n) ∈ Zn. Obviously, t1 + t2 = t1 + t2, and −t = −t. Furthermore,
by deﬁnition, ai = ei where ei is the ith unit vector.
We recall that a Z-module, or simply module, is an Abelian groupM equipped with an operation
of scalar multiplication such that (x + y) = x + y and (−x) = −x for all  ∈ Z and x, y ∈ M .
Here we are interested in the module Zn, where scalar multiplication with an integer is deﬁned as
usual, and sub-modules thereof.
For x1, . . . , xm ∈ Zn we denote by 〈x1, . . . , xm〉 the sub-module of Zn generated by x1, . . . , xm, that
is
〈x1, . . . , xm〉 = {1x1 + · · ·mxm | i ∈ Z}
It is of course decidable whether y ∈ 〈x1, . . . , xm〉 for given y , x1, . . . , xm since deciding this question
amounts to solving a system of linear equations over Z. We will construct, for any given ﬁnite set
L and term w, a ﬁnite set of generators for the set of (L,w)-elementary terms that are elementarily
deducible from L. This will be achieved by a ﬁxed point construction. In order to guarantee that the
ﬁxed point is reached in a ﬁnite number of steps we need an operation which allows us to extend a
submodule by a new generator, but in such a way that the new generator is only added if necessary,
and such that the generator is “small”. In order to make this notion of “small” precise we write for
x = (x1, . . . , xn), y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Zn that xy if |xi| ≤ |yi| for all i, and x  y if xy and x /= y .
Deﬁnition 11. We deﬁne the relation Ext(l1, x, l2) where l1 and l2 are ﬁnite lists over Zn and x ∈ Zn
by: Ext((x1, . . . , xn), x, l) holds in any of the following cases:
• x ∈ 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 and l = (x1, . . . , xn).
• x ∈ 〈x1, . . . , xn〉andl = (x1, . . . , xn, y)wherey isminimalintheordersuchthaty ∈ x + 〈x1, . . . , xn〉.
Note that in the second case of this deﬁnition there may be different choices for y , These choices
differ only in the sign of the components.
We recall that Presburger arithmetic, that is the ﬁrst-order theory of (Z,+,>), is decidable.
The absolute value of y ∈ Z is deﬁnable by a formula, that is z = |y| can be expressed as (y ≥
0 → z = y) ∧ (y < 0 → z = −y). As a consequence, the formula deﬁning xy is a also a formu-
la of Presburger arithmetic. Membership x ∈ 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 is expressible by ∃1, . . . ,n(x = iixi).
Moreover x ∈ 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 is simply the negation of the membership formula. The set of minimal
elements with respect to  in a set S ⊆ Zn deﬁned by a Presburger formula x ∈ S is deﬁned by
x ∈ S ∧ ¬(∃y(y ∈ S ∧ y  x)). Putting all these formulas together, we get a deﬁnition of all l2 such
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that Ext(l1, x, l2) holds for given l1 and x. From this formula, one can easily compute one particular
l2.
We recall Dickson’s classical lemma [36]. Note that in this lemma tuples are tuples of natural
numbers.
Lemma 10 (Dickson’s lemma). For each inﬁnite sequence t1, t2, . . . of distinct n-tuples of N there exists
i < j such that ti  tj.
We can now show that there is no inﬁnite chain in the relation Ext:
Lemma 11. Let x1, . . . , xi, . . . ∈ Zn be an inﬁnite sequence, l0 the empty sequence, and Ext(li, xi+1, li+1)
for every i. Then there exists an i such that li = lj for every j ≥ i.
Proof. Assume that the sequence (li)i∈N is not eventually stationary. There exists an inﬁnite subse-
quence of (li)i∈N such that its respective last elements have the same sign (since there are only 2n
many possible signs). It follows that the chosen subsequence is not eventually stationary either.
We can decompose for any i : li = l′i · x′i where x′i is the last element of li . By Dickson’s lemma
there are li, lj in this subsequence with i < j and x′ix′j . By construction, li is a preﬁx of the sequence
l′j , and hence x′i ∈ 〈l′j〉. Since x′j ∈ xj + 〈l′j〉 for some xj , this means that x′j − x′i ∈ xj + 〈l′j〉 by deﬁni-
tion of 〈l′j〉. Since x′i and x′j have the same sign, x′j − x′i is strictly smaller than x′j in the order. This
contradicts the minimality of x′j in the deﬁnition of Ext. 
We use the Z-modules to model all the terms that the rule (GX) can construct. Now, we analyze
more precisely in Lemma 12 how the generators of a Z-module are modiﬁed by the application of
a rule (Dk).
Lemma 12. Let g1, . . . , gm ∈ Zn.We can compute a ﬁnite set of generators of
Dk(g
1, . . . , gm) = {t | {t}k ∈ 〈g1, . . . , gm〉}
Proof. First we calculate a set of generators of
Kk(g
1, . . . , gm) = {{t}k | {t}k ∈ 〈g1, . . . , gm〉}
Let Ik be the set of indices corresponding to atoms encrypted by the key k , that is
Ik = {i | ai = {aj}k for some j}
where the (a1, . . . , an) is the enumeration of atoms(L,w) chosen at the beginning of the section. An
(L,w)-elementary term t, whose representation t is (1, . . . ,n), is of the form {u}k iff i = 0 for every
i ∈ Ik . Hence, (1, . . . ,n) ∈ Kk(g1, . . . , gm) iff
{
(1, . . . ,n) = 1g1 + · · · + mgm
and i = 1g1i + · · ·mgmi = 0 for every i ∈ Ik
The set of m-tuples (1, . . . ,m) satisfying this system of equations forms a sub-module of Zm. We
can compute a ﬁnite set B of generators of this submodule as follows. Each i can be written i − i
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with i, i ≥ 0. Then the equations 1g1i + . . . mgmi = 0 for ∈ Ik deﬁne an homogeneous system (H)
where the unknowns i, i belong to N. Therefore a 2m-tuple (1, . . . , m, 1, . . . , m) is a solution of
(H) iff it is a linear combination with coefﬁcients in N of the (ﬁnitely many) minimal solutions of
(H). Any linear combination with coefﬁcients in Z is also a solution of (H).
Therefore, any solution  can be expressed as a linear combination with coefﬁcient in Z of
elements of the ﬁnite set
B = {(	1 − 	1 , . . . , 	m − 	m)|(	1 , . . . , 	m , 	1 , . . . , 	m) minimal solution of (H)}
Conversely, any linear combination with coefﬁcient in Z of elements of B is a solution of the original
set of equations.
This proves that B is a ﬁnite set of generators.
Then we obtain that
G = {b1g1 + · · · + bmgm | (b1, . . . , bm) ∈ B}
is a ﬁnite set of generators of Kk(g1, . . . , gm).
We ﬁnally obtain a ﬁnite set of generators of Dk(g1, . . . , gm) by “shifting” the elements of G. Let
shift k(1, . . . ,n) be the vector (1, . . . ,n) deﬁned by
i =
{
j if {ai}k = aj ∈ atoms(L,w)
0 if {ai}k ∈ atoms(L,w)
The ﬁnite set of generators of Dk(g1, . . . , gm) is shift k(G). 
Lemma 13 below is the analog of Lemma 12 for the rule (Dk).
Lemma 13. Let g1, . . . , gm ∈ Zn.We can compute a ﬁnite set of generators of
Ck(g
1, . . . , gm) = {{t}k | t ∈ 〈g1, . . . , gm〉, atoms({t}k) ⊆ atoms(L,w)}
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 12. We now construct ﬁrst a ﬁnite set B of
generators of the set
K−1k (g
1, . . . , gm) = {t | t ∈ 〈g1, . . . , gm〉 and atoms({t}k) ⊆ atoms(L,w)}
that is of the set of terms whose encryption with k is again an (L,w) elementary term. The ﬁnite
set of generators of Ck(g1, . . . , gm) is obtained as shift
−1
k (B), where shift
−1
k (1, . . . ,n) is the vector
(1, . . . ,n) deﬁned by
i =
{
j if ai = {aj}k with aj ∈ atoms(L,w)
0 if ai is not of the form {aj}k with aj ∈ atoms(L,w) 
Lemma 14. We can compute, given a ﬁnite set L of terms and a term w, a ﬁnite set of generators of the
set of (L,w)-elementary terms that are elementarily deducible from L.
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Proof. Let, as above, atoms(L,w) = {a1, . . . , an}, and L = {t1, . . . , tp }. We deﬁne a relation
 between
ﬁnite lists of vectors as follows:
Given a ﬁnite set l of vectors, let x1, . . . , xp be the union of the ﬁnite sets of generators of
Dk(l) with k ∈ L computed according to Lemma 12, and let xp+1, . . . , xq be the union of the
ﬁnite sets of generators of Ck(l) with k ∈ L computed according to Lemma 13. Then 
(l, l′)
holds iff there are ﬁnite lists of vectors l0, . . . , lq such that l = l0, l′ = lq, andExt(li−1, xi, li) holds for
all i.
Let l0 = (tp , . . . , tp ), and 
(li, li+1) for any i. By Lemma 11, there exists an i such that li+1 = li .
By construction, this li is the ﬁnite set of generators of the set of (L,w)-elementary terms that are
elementarily deducible from L. 
9. Decidability of the intruder deduction problem in the general case
We sum up the results obtained so far to state our main results for the general case.
Theorem 15. The intruder deduction problem can be decided in EXPTIME for the theory of exclu-
sive-or with distributive encryption.
Proof. By Lemmas 9, 8 and the decidability of elementary deducibility, we get that there is a proof
iff there is a proof such that all nodes belong to ST+(T ,w) = {a1 + · · · + ap |ai ∈ atoms(T ,w)ai /=
aj , i, j = 1, · · · , p} which has an exponential size in |T | + |w|. 
Theorem 16. The intruder deduction problem is decidable for the theory of Abelian groups with dis-
tributive encryption.
Proof. By Lemmas 9, 8 and the decidability of elementary deducibility, we get that there is a proof
consisting of applications of rules (A), (UR), (UL), (P) and (GXCD) for which the premises and the
conclusions belong to S(T ,w). This proof has polynomial size in |T | + |w|, but we cannot give a
polynomial complexity result since deciding elementary deducibility for the rule (GXCD) relies on
Dickson’s lemma. 
10. Decidability of the intruder deduction problem in the binary case
We call a term in normal form top-binary if it is the difference of two different terms not headed
with + or with −, and at most binary if all its syntactic subterms are either top-binary or not headed
with + or −. Note that for example a− b is at most binary, while 2a and 3a− 2b are not.
A set is at most binary if each of its elements is. Note that if the set T is at most binary then S(T)
is at most binary as well. A proof tree P is called at most binary if for all its nodes T  u the term u
is at most binary.
Our goal is to give a polynomial algorithm for the intruder deduction problem when the set of
hypotheses and the conclusion are at most binary. By Lemma 5 it is sufﬁcient to show that one-step
deducibility by the rule (GXCD) is decidable in polynomial time in case the hypotheses and the
conclusion are at most binary.
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The decision algorithm for one-step deducibility by (GXCD) in the binary case is obtained by
analyzing the proof trees that make up the “macro rule” (GXCD). In the general case, this was done
by showing that we can restrict the search of such a proof tree to elementary trees (Section 7), and
then that existence of such an elementary proof tree can be decided by algebraic means (Section 8).
In the binary case we will show that we can restrict the search of proof trees to proof trees which
are at most binary (Subsection 10.1), and then that existence of such a proof tree can be decided by
using methods of preﬁx rewriting (Subsection 10.2).
10.1. At most binary proofs
In this section, we will show how to transform such a proof into a proof which is at most binary.
Example 5. The following (GCD) proof tree of {c}k − {b}k with L = {a− b, c − d , {d}k − {a}k} and
K = {k} is not at most binary
However, there is a proof tree which is at most binary
Deﬁnition 12. For a set U of terms we denote by 〈U 〉 the set of terms
〈U 〉 = {(1u1 + · · · + nun)↓ |  ∈ Z, ui ∈ U }
In other words, 〈U 〉 is the set of terms in normal form that can be obtained from some subset of U
by applying the rule (GX).
Proposition 8. Let U be a ﬁnite set of at most binary terms and u ∈ 〈U 〉. Then there exist at most
binary terms v1, . . . , vk ∈ 〈U 〉 with u ∈ 〈v1, . . . , vk〉 and atoms(v1, . . . , vk) ⊆ atoms(u).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the cardinality of U . If u = 0 then we choose k = 0. Otherwise
there exists an a ∈ atoms(u), and a term u0 ∈ U such that a ∈ atoms(u0). Let  be the factor with
which u0 contributes to the construction of u, that is u = u0 + u′ with u′ ∈ 〈U \ {u0}〉.
By induction hypothesis there are at most binary terms v′1, . . . , v
′
l ∈ 〈U \ {u0}〉 such that u′ ∈〈v′1, . . . , v′l〉 and atoms(v′1, . . . , v′l) ⊆ atoms(u′).
There are three cases:
(1) u0 is not headed with +, that is u0 = a. We choose k = l+ 1, vi = v′i for i < k , and vk = u0.
Since ui ∈ 〈U \ {u0}〉 for i < k we obviously also have ui ∈ 〈U 〉 for i < k , and vk ∈ 〈U 〉 holds
since u0 ∈ U .
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By construction we have that u ∈ 〈v1, . . . , vk〉, and since a ∈ atoms(u)we have that atoms(u) =
atoms(u′) ∪ {a}. Hence, atoms(vi) ⊆ atoms(u′) ⊆ atoms(u) for i < k by induction hypothesis,
and atoms(vk) = {a} ⊆ atoms(u) by choice of a.
(2) u0 = a− b or u0 = b− a for b ∈ atoms(u). This case is similar to the ﬁrst case: we choose
k = l+ 1, vi = v′i for i < k , and vk = u0. As above, ui ∈ 〈U 〉 for i ≤ k . Also, we have again that
u ∈ 〈v1, . . . , vk〉. Concerning the atoms of u we now have that atoms(u) = atoms(u′) ∪ {a, b}.
Hence, atoms(v1, . . . , vk) ⊆ atoms(u).
(3) u0 = a− b or u0 = b− a for some atom b, and b ∈ atoms(u). We can assume w.l.o.g. that
u0 = a− b.
We can write every v′i with 1 ≤ i ≤ l as v′i = ia+ ib+ v′′i with a, b ∈ atoms(v′′i ). We choose
k = l, and vi = (i + i)a+ v′′i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k .
For any i there can be at most two atoms in v′′i since v′i is at most binary.
– If v′′i contains two atoms then i = i = 0, and vi = v′i is at most binary.
– Otherwise, if v′′i contains at most one atom, then v is at most binary since b ∈ atoms(vi).
For any i, v′i + iu0 = (i + i)a+ v′′i = vi, and hence vi ∈ 〈U 〉.
By construction, atoms(vi) ⊆ atoms(v′i) ∪ {a} \ {b} ⊆ atoms(u).
It remains to show that u ∈ 〈v1, . . . , vk〉. Let u′ = i=ni=1iv′i . First note that, since u = u0 +
i=ni=1iv′i = a− b+ i=ni=1i(ia+ ib+ v′′i ) and b ∈ atoms(u, v′′1 , . . . , v′′n) that  = i=ni=1ii .
Now, we have that
i=ni=1ivi = i=ni=1i(v′i + iu0) = i=ni=1iv′i + (i=ni=1ii)u0 = u′ + u0 = u 
Lemma 17. Let P be a GCD-proof tree with leaves L, set of keys K , and root r. If L and r are at most
binary then there exists an at most binary GCD-proof tree P ′ with leaves L′ ⊆ L, keys K ′ ⊆ K , and
root r.
Proof. First note that for any instance of a rule (C) or (D), which can be seen as special cases of
GCD-proof trees, the root is at most binary if and only if the leaf is at most binary. Hence, if all
instances of (GX) in the proof tree P have an at most binary result then P is at most binary.
Otherwise, there exists an instance of (GX) whose result is not at most binary and where all the
leaves are at most binary. Since the root of P is at most binary, the path from the root of the instance
of (GX) to the root of P eventually leads to another instance of the (GX) rule. That is, we have a
proof tree of the following form:
where (C ,D) is any instance of a rule (C) or (D), and where the keys are omitted for the
sake of clarity. By Proposition 8 there are at most binary terms v1, . . . , vk ∈ 〈u1, . . . , un〉 such that
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u ∈ 〈v1, . . . , vk〉 and atoms(v1, . . . , vk) ⊆ atoms(u). We hence obtain, where we abbreviate by T  U
the set of sequents {T  z | z ∈ U }:
In this proof tree we hence have that vi ∈ 〈U 〉 is at most binary for every i. We can now apply
the inverse transformation of Fig. 5 and commute the (GX) rule with succeeding (C) rules. Since
atoms(vi) ⊆ atoms(u) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k we can also commute this (GX) rule with succeeding (D) rules.
We hence obtain
where u′ ∈ 〈u′1, . . . , u′n〉. We may now apply the induction hypothesis to this proof tree since the
number of instances of (GX) with a non at most binary result has decreased by one. 
We can now deﬁne the (GCD) proof rule: an instance of this rule is a particular form of a
GCD-proof tree.
Deﬁnition 13. The rule (GCD) consists of all GCD-proof trees with exactly one instance of (GX),
where all instances of (C) are above the (GX) rule, and all instances of (D) are below the (GX) rule.
Deﬁnition 14. Let, for any set T of terms in normal form,
S+2(T) = atoms(T) ∪ {a1 − a2 | a1, a2 ∈ atoms(T), a1 /= a2}
Lemma 18. Let P be a GCD-proof tree with leaves L, keys K , and root r. If L ∪ {r} ∈ S+2(T) for some
set of terms T then there exists a proof tree using exclusively the (GCD) rule such that all nodes are in
S+2(T).
Proof. By Lemma 6 there is a simple and and +-eager GCD-proof tree P ′. We now apply the
transformation of the proof of Lemma 17. Since P ′ is simple the only possible sequence of rule
applications between two consecutive (GX) rules is some applications of (D), followed by some
applications of (C). The “frontier” between two instances of the rule (GCD) is at the end of the
sequence of (D) rule applications. Since u ∈ S+2(T) by hypothesis, we also have that vi ∈ S+2(T)
since for all i we have that atoms(v) ⊆ atoms(u) and vi is at most binary. As a consequence, any
term obtained by a sequence of decryptions form vi is also in S+2(T). 
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Fig. 8. Illustration of the third case.
10.2. Deciding one-step reducibility by the (GCD) rule
In this section, we will use an abbreviation for sequences of encryptions and write {m}x1···xn for{· · · {m}x1 · · ·}xn .
We are now facedwith the problem of checking whether, for a given setU of atmost binary terms
and an at most binary term r there is an instance of rule (GCD) with leaves and keys contained in
U and root r. There are three possible cases to consider
(1) r is not headed with +, and there is a sequence of top-binary terms ({ai}vi − {bi}vi )i=1,...,N
such that for every i one of {ai}vi − {bi}vi and {bi}vi − {ai}vi is in U , a term aN+1 ∈ U not
headed with +, and a sequence (hi)i=0,...,N+1 of words in U ∗ such that {r}h0 = {a1}v1h1 and{bi}vihi = {ai+1}vi+1hi+1 for i = 1, . . . ,N .
(2) r is a top-binary term r1 − r2, and there are two instances of the rule (GCD) as in the ﬁrst case
with roots r1, respectively, r2, and with the same sequence of keys hi .
(3) r is a top-binary term r1 − r2, and there is a sequence of top-binary terms ({ai}vi − {bi}vi )i=1,...,N
such that for every i one of {ai}vi − {bi}vi and {bi}vi − {ai}vi is inU , and a sequence (hi)i=0,...,N of
words in U ∗ such that {r1}h0 = {a1}v1h1 , {bi}vihi = {ai+1}vi+1hi+1 for i = 1, . . . ,N − 1, and{bN }vN hN = {r2}h0 .
In the following we will only consider the last case, which is illustrated by Fig. 8, since the ﬁrst
two cases can be checked in a very similar way. In this ﬁgure the sequence of encryption keys is
not displayed. We have a binary term as the conclusion of the rule (GX), to which a sequence of
decryptions (D) is applied, and a sequence of binary terms as hypotheses of the rule (GX) each of
which is obtained by a sequence of encryptions (C). In this sequence of terms, the atoms are canceled
out in pairs (indicated by the arcs in the ﬁgure), leaving only the very ﬁrst and the very last one to
form the result of (GX).
The idea is to reduce the problem to reachability in a preﬁx rewrite system [37]. Let us ﬁrst explain
the construction at hand of a special case. We view a term {a}xyz , where a is not headed with + and
not of the form {m}k , as the term axyz. That is, the string representation consists of a constant denot-
ing the message, followed by the sequence of keys from the innermost to the outermost encryption.
Alternatively, this can be seen as a conﬁguration of a pushdown process with state a and stack xyz,
where the innermost encryption key is on top of the stack.
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If we ignore for the moment possible instances of the rule (D), and if we assume for the moment
that all terms in key positions of terms in U are also contained in U then we can just construct the
preﬁx rewrite system which, for any binary term {a}v − {b}w ∈ L, rewrites any term avx into bwx,
and vice versa
{av → bw | {a}v − {b}w ∈ U or {b}w − {a}v ∈ U }
If we wish to check for an instance of the rule (GCD) with root {a}v − {b}w then we just have to test
whether the string av rewrites to the string bw in this preﬁx rewrite system.
Example 6. Consider U = {a− {b}12, {b}1 − {c}3, 1, 2, 3, 4}, and r = {a}4 − {c}324 (in this, as in the
following example, we use numbers for keys). There is a (GCD) proof tree with leaves and keys and
L and root r:
The preﬁx rewrite system obtained from L is
{a → b12, b12 → a, b1 → c3, c3 → b1}
With this rewrite system we have the rewrite sequence
a4 → b124 → c324
The ﬁrst difﬁculty is that some of the keys may not be contained in U . In this case we may rewrite
avx into bwx only when x ∈ U ∗, that is when x is a sequence of symbols from U . We can implement
this check, in terms of a pushdown process, by maintaining a marker symbol # on the stack which
is always at the topmost position such that all symbols below # are in U . Formally, let left (x) and
right (x), for any string x, be such that x = left (x) · right (x), and such that right (x) is the maximal
sufﬁx of x which lies in U ∗. Then we construct the rewrite system as follows, in order to assure that
all redexes comprise, or are adjacent to the marker #:
{ a left (v)#right (v) → b left (w)#right (w) |
{a}v − {b}w ∈ U or {b}w − {a}v ∈ U }
Example 7.We apply this reﬁned construction to the variant obtained fromExample 6 by removing
the key 1 from set U . Then we obtain the same (GCD) proof tree as in Example 6 since this proof
tree does not use an encoding with the key 1. The rewrite system is now
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{a# → b1#2, b1#2 → a, b1# → c#3, c#3 → b1#}
With this rewrite system we have the rewrite sequence
a#4 → b1#24 → c#324
However, if we remove the key 2 as well from the set U then the above proof tree is not legitimate
(since we cannot encode with 2). The rewrite system in this case is
{a# → b12#, b12# → a, b1# → c#3, c#3 → b1#}
With this system, we can rewrite a#4 into b12#, but then we can no longer apply the rewrite rule
b1# → c#3.
Finally, it may be possible that the result of the (GCD) rule is only obtained after some sequence
of decryptions from the result of the (GX) rule. We hence cut now the rewrite process in two con-
secutive processes. During the ﬁrst process, if we have a stack x and wish to apply a rewrite rule
the left-hand side of which contains x as a proper preﬁx then we just put the missing symbols with
a negative sign on the stack. In the second process we do the reverse action, that is if some neg-
ative symbols are on the top of the stack and if the right-hand side of the rewrite rule produces
these symbols, then we just pop these negative symbols from the stack. We denote the negation
of a symbol a as a. The states of the second process are decorated with a hat in order to keep the
two state spaces disjoint. We denote by x for any x = x1 · · · xn the string xn · · · x1 (note the inver-
sion of the order). The symbol ⊥ is used to denote the right end of a string (i.e., the bottom of a
stack).
Deﬁnition 15. We deﬁne sta({t}k) = sta(t), sta(t) =⋃a∈atoms(t) sta(a), and sta(t) = {t} if t is not
headed with + and not of the form {x}y .
We deﬁne keys ({t}k) = keys (t) ∪ {k}, keys (t) =⋃a∈atoms(t) keys (a), and keys (t) = ∅ if t is not
headed with + and not of the form {x}y .
For a set T of terms we deﬁne sta(T) =⋃t∈T sta(t) and keys (T) =
⋃
t∈T keys (t).
Example 8. Let T = {{a}bc − {d}e, {d}ce}, then sta(T) = {a, d} and keys (T) = {b, c, e}.
We deﬁne, for given setU of at most binary terms and an at most binary term r two preﬁx rewrite
systems. Let Q = sta(U , r) and C = keys (U , r).
(1) The preﬁx rewrite system PR1 is deﬁned by the following rules:
{ a left (v)#right (v) → b left (w)#right (w)
a left (v)#v1 → b left (w)#right (w)v2 |
{a}v − {b}w ∈ U or {b}w − {a}v ∈ U ,
v1v2 = right (v),
 ∈ {⊥} ∪ {u | u ∈ U } }
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(2) The preﬁx rewrite system PR2 is deﬁned by the following rules:
{ aˆ left (v)#right (v) → bˆ left (w)#right (w)
aˆ left (v)#right (v)w2 → bˆ left (w)#w1 |
{a}v − {b}w ∈ U or {b}w − {a}v ∈ U ,
w1w2 = right (w)}
These two rewrite systems are symmetric one to the other with the technical exception that the
symbol  in the system PR1 serves to ensure the invariant that no negative symbol occurs to the left
of a non-negative symbol. The system PR2 maintains this invariant since it cannot push negative
symbols. Note that we have in the ﬁrst case a rewrite rule for every decomposition of right (v) into
v1 and v2, and in the second case a rewrite rule for every decomposition of right (w) into w1 and w2.
We can ﬁnally deﬁne the complete rewrite system as consisting of the following rules:
PR1 ∪ PR2 ∪ {a → aˆ | a ∈ Q}
Example 9. LetU = {{a}12 − b, {b}34 − c, c − {d}234, 1, 2, 3, 4}, and r = a− {d}1. We only give the re-
write rules which are relevant for this example: the system PR1 contains, among others, the rules
a#⊥ → b#21⊥ and b#2 → c#432. The system PR2 contains the rule cˆ#432 → dˆ#. Hence, we have
the rewrite sequence
a#⊥ → b#21⊥ → c#4321⊥ → cˆ#4321⊥ → dˆ#1⊥
The following two lemmas state the central property of each of these two preﬁx rewrite systems.
Lemma 19. The following two assertions are equivalent for every a, b ∈ Q, x1, y1 ∈ {} ∪ C∗(C \ U),
x2, y2, y3 ∈ U ∗:
(1) There is a preﬁx rewrite sequence by PR1
ax1#x2⊥ →∗ by1#y2y3⊥
(2) either a = b, x1 = y1, x2 = y2, y3 = ,
or there exists a sequence of binary terms {ai}vi − {bi}wi ∈ U , i = 1, . . . , n, and a sequence of
strings hi ∈ U ∗, i = 1, . . . , n, such that
(a) {a}x1x2y3 = {a1}v1h1
(b) {bi}wihi = {ai+1}vi+1hi+1 for i = 1, . . . , n− 1
(c) {bn}wnhn = {b}y1y2
and such that for some i the longest common sufﬁx of y3 and hi is .
Lemma 20. The following two assertions are equivalent for every a, b ∈ Q, x1, y1 ∈ {} ∪ C∗(C \ U),
x2, y2, y3 ∈ U ∗:
P. Lafourcade et. al. / Information and Computation 205 (2007) 581–623 615
(1) There is a preﬁx rewrite sequence by PR2
aˆx1#x2x3⊥ →∗ bˆy1#y2⊥
(2) either a = b, x1 = y1, x2 = y2, x3 = ,
or there exists a sequence of binary terms {ai}vi − {bi}wi ∈ U , i = 1, . . . , n, and a sequence of
strings hi ∈ U ∗, i = 1, . . . , n, such that
(a) {a}x1x2 = {a1}v1h1
(b) {bi}wihi = {ai+1}vi+1hi+1 for i = 1, . . . , n− 1
(c) {bn}wnhn = {b}y1y2x3
and such that for some i the longest common sufﬁx of x3 and hi is .
The proof of these two lemmas can be found in the Appendix A.
Hence, if t and s are both not of the form {m}k then there is a proof of T  {t}v − {s}w if and only
if for some u, x1, x2, x3:
t left (v)#right (v)⊥ →∗ u x1#x2x3 → uˆ x1#x2x3 →∗ sˆ left (w)#right (w)⊥
Lemma 21. Let L be a set of at most binary terms, K a set of terms, and r an at most binary term. It
is decidable in polynomial time whether there exists an instance of the (GCD) rule with leaves L, keys
K , and root r.
Proof. By Lemmas 19 and 20, checking an instance of (GCD) reduces to a reachability problem in
a preﬁx rewrite system of polynomial size (note that we may w.l.o.g. exclude instances of (GCD)
where all hypotheses of (GX) are obtained by some (Cv) and where there is (Dv) immediately below
the (GX)). This can be done in polynomial time [37]. 
As a consequence we obtain.
Theorem 22. The binary intruder deduction problem for the equational theory of Abelian groups with
distributive encryption is decidable in polynomial time.
11. Conclusion
Public key encryption. Moving from symmetric key encryption (as used in this paper) to pub-
lic key encryption simply amounts to adding a new operator I which computes the private key
associated to a public key. Then, the decryption rule becomes
T  {u}v ↓R/ACT  I(v)↓R/AC
T  u↓R/AC
and the deﬁnition of subterms is completed by S(I(t)) = {I(t)}, stating that the inverse operation
hides its argument. The lemmas and proofs stated in the symmetric case are extended to this frame-
work in a straightforward way.
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Related works. The use of locality in the analysis of cryptographic protocols has been used
ﬁrst in [38], and later on by [12,13]. In [39], we studied the case of a homomorphic operator that
distributes over some binary operation + which can be one of a the free associative–commu-
tative operator, the exclusive-or operator, or the addition of an Abelian group. The EXPTIME
result that we obtained for the intruder deduction problem for the theory of exclusive-or and
a homomorphism has been strengthened in [17] to get a PTIME decision procedure by means
of the resolution of polynomial equations in /2[X ]. There are two main differences with the
present work: First, the homomorphism is an isolated operation not related to the encryption
operation, which is less realistic than our model. Second, the polynomial complexity obtained
in [17] relies on the fact that there is only a ﬁxed number of homomorphisms, while our case
can be seen as the one of an inﬁnite family of homomorphisms (one for every possible key).
Even in light of a locality result, which implies that only the keys occurring in the goal term or
in the set of hypotheses are relevant for a proof, the number of homomorphisms still depends
in our case on the problem instance.
Further work. A main step of our approach uses an idea which is similar to the one used in [17]:
regroup certain combinations of “+-constructions”, encryptions, and (in our case) decryptions into
one “macro” rule, the instances of which are then decided by an ad hoc method (here linear algebra
or preﬁx rewriting in the binary case). This could be probably formalized into a generic solution
to solve the intruder deduction problem. The active case is more problematic since undecidability
results show that this case is much more complex.
Another issue raised by our result is to extend this framework to the case of a commutative en-
cryption, i.e., {{x}y}z = {{x}z}y . A preliminarywork in this direction suggests that the same approach
can be used successfully [40], but that a lower EXPSPACE bound could be established in case of
non-symmetric keys, i.e., when there is an explicit operation I to compute the inverse of a key such
that a term {x}y can be decrypted only if one knows I(y).
Appendix A. Proofs for Section 10
Deﬁnition 16. We call a string admissible for given Q,C ,U if it is of the form qx1#x2x3⊥ where
• there is some a ∈ Q such that q = a or q = aˆ
• either x1 =  or x1 ∈ C∗(C \ U)
• x2, x3 ∈ U ∗
Proposition 9. The preﬁx rewrite system of Section 10 rewrites admissible strings into admissible
strings.
The following proposition lists some basic properties of the decomposition and inversion of
strings which we will use in the sequel without further reference.
Proposition 10. For all x, y ∈ (C ∪ U)∗ :
(1) xy = y x
(2) If y ∈ U ∗ then left (xy) = left (x) and right (xy) = right (x)y
P. Lafourcade et. al. / Information and Computation 205 (2007) 581–623 617
We now prove the central lemmas of the preﬁx rewrite construction.
Lemma 23. The following two assertions are equivalent for every a, b ∈ Q, x1, y1 ∈ {} ∪ C∗(C \ U),
x2, y2, y3 ∈ U ∗:
(1) There is a preﬁx rewrite sequence by PR1
ax1#x2⊥ →∗ by1#y2y3⊥
(2) either a = b, x1 = y1, x2 = y2, y3 = ,
or there exists a sequence of binary terms {ai}vi − {bi}wi ∈ U , i = 1, . . . , n, and a sequence of
strings hi ∈ U ∗, i = 1, . . . , n, such that
(a) {a}x1x2y3 = {a1}v1h1
(b) {bi}wihi = {ai+1}vi+1hi+1 for i = 1, . . . , n− 1
(c) {bn}wnhn = {b}y1y2
and such that for some i the longest common sufﬁx of y3 and hi is .
Lemma 24. The following two assertions are equivalent for every a, b ∈ Q, x1, y1 ∈ {} ∪ C∗(C \ U),
x2, y2, y3 ∈ U ∗:
(1) There is a preﬁx rewrite sequence by PR2
aˆx1#x2x3⊥ →∗ bˆy1#y2⊥
(2) either a = b, x1 = y1, x2 = y2, x3 = ,
or there exists a sequence of binary terms {ai}vi − {bi}wi ∈ U , i = 1, . . . , n, and a sequence of
strings hi ∈ U ∗, i = 1, . . . , n, such that
(a) {a}x1x2 = {a1}v1h1
(b) {bi}wihi = {ai+1}vi+1hi+1 for i = 1, . . . , n− 1
(c) {bn}wnhn = {b}y1y2x3
and such that for some i the longest common sufﬁx of x3 and hi is .
Proof. First note that the two preﬁx rewrite systems PR1 and PR2 are completely symmetrical (the
only purpose of the occurrences of  in PR1 is to guarantee admissibility of all reachable conﬁgu-
rations). We hence prove only the ﬁrst lemma, corresponding to the rewrite system PR1. The proof
of the second lemma is completely symmetrical.
For the direction from (1) to (2) we proceed by induction on the length of the rewrite sequence.
If the length of the rewrite sequence is 0 then obviously a = b, x1 = y1, x2 = y2, and y3 = . If there
is exactly one rewrite step then there are two possible cases:
(1) The rewrite rule is of the form
a left (r)#right (r) → b left (s)#right (s)
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Then there exists a u such that
x1 = left (r) y1 = left (s)
x2 = right (r)u y2 = right (s)u
y3 = 
We conclude by choosing
{a1}v1 − {b1}w1 := {a}r − {b}s
h1 := u
since then
{a}x1x2y3 = {a}x1x2 = {a}ru = {a1}v1h1
{b1}w1h1 = {b}su = {b}y1y2
(2) The rewrite rule is of the form
a left (r)#r1⊥ → b left (s)#right (s)r2⊥
with right (r) = r1r2. Then we have
x1 = left (r) y1 = left (s)
x2 = r1 y2 = right (s)
y3 = r2, hence y3 = r2
We conclude by choosing
{a1}v1 − {b1}w1 := {a}r − {b}s
h1 := 
since then
{a}x1x2y3 = {a}r = {a1}v1h1
{b1}w1h1 = {b}s = {b}y1y2
In both cases, the longest common sufﬁx of h1 and y3 is .
In case there are N > 1 rewrite steps, the string obtained in N − 1 steps is by Proposition 9 ad-
missible. Hence, there are b ∈ Q, y1 ∈ {} ∪ C∗(C \ U), and y2, y3 ∈ U ∗ such that
ax1#x2⊥ →∗ by1#y2y3⊥ → cz1#z2z3⊥
By induction hypothesis, there exists a sequence of binary terms {ai}vi − {bi}wi ∈ U , i = 1, . . . , n, and
a sequence of strings hi ∈ U ∗, i = 1, . . . , n, such that
(1) {a}x1x2y3 = {a1}v1h1
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(2) {bi}wihi = {ai+1}vi+1hi+1 for i = 1, . . . , n− 1
(3) {bn}wnhn = {b}y1y2
and such that the longest common sufﬁx of y3 and some hi is . We will show that there exists some
{an+1}vn+1 − {bn+1}wn+1 ∈ U , and a sequence of key strings ki ∈ K∗, i = 1, . . . , n+ 1 such that
(1) {a}x1x2z3 = {a1}v1k1
(2) {bi}wiki = {ai+1}vi+1ki+1 for i = 1, . . . , n
(3) {bn+1}wn+1kn+1 = {c}z1z2
and such that the common longest sufﬁx of y3 and some kj is . There are two possible cases for the
rewrite rule used in the last rewrite step
(1) The rewrite rule is of the form
b left (r)#right (r) → c left (s)#right (s)
Then there exists u such that
y1 = left (r) z1 = left (s)
y2 = right (r)u z2 = right (s)u
z3 = y3, hence z3 = y3
We conclude by choosing
{an+1}vn+1 − {bn+1}wn+1 := {b}r − {c}s
ki := hi (i = 1, . . . , n)
kn+1 := u
since
{a}x1x2z3 = {a}x1x2y3 = {a1}v1h1 = {a1}v1k1
{bi}wiki = {bi}wihi = {ai+1}vi+1hi+1 = {ai+1}vi+1ki+1 (i = 1, . . . , n− 1)
{bn}wnkn = {b}y1y2 = {b}ru = {an+1}vn+1kn+1
{bn+1}wn+1kn+1 = {c}su = {c}z1z2
If the longest common sufﬁx of y3 and hi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is  then the longest common sufﬁx of
z3 = y3 and ki = hi is .
(2) The rewrite rule is of the form
b left (r)#r1 → c left (s)#right (s)r2
with right (r) = r1r2, and  ∈ {u | u ∈ U } ∪ {⊥}. Then we have
y1 = left (r) z1 = left (s)
y2 = r1 z2 = right (s)
z3 = r2 y3, hence z3 = y3r2
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We conclude by choosing
{an+1}vn+1 − {bn+1}wn+1 := {b}r − {c}s
ki := hir2 (i = 1, . . . , n)
kn+1 := 
since
{a}x1x2z3 = {a}x1x2y3r2 = {a1}v1h1r2 = {a1}v1k1
{bi}wiki = {bi}wihir2 = {ai+1}vi+1hi+1r2 = {ai+1}vi+1ki+1 (i = 1, . . . , n− 1)
{bn}wnkn = {bn}wnhnr2 = {b}y1y2r2 = {b}r = {an+1}vn+1kn+1
{bn+1}wn+1kn+1 = {bn+1}wn+1 = {c}s = {c}z1z2
The longest common sufﬁx of z3 and kn+1 =  is .
For the direction from (2) to (1), if a = b, x1 = y1, x2 = y2, and y3 =  then we obviously have
that ax1#x2⊥ →∗ by1#y2y3⊥. Otherwise, we proceed by induction on n.
If n = 1 then there exists {a1}v1 − {b1}wi ∈ U and h1 ∈ U ∗ such that
(1) {a}x1x2y3 = {a1}v1h1
(2) {b1}w1h1 = {b}y1y2
and the longest common sufﬁx of y3 and h1 is , that is y3 =  or h1 = .
(1) If y3 =  then x1#x2 = left (v1)#right (v1)h1 and y1#y2 = left (w1)#right (w2)h1, hence ax1#x2⊥
→ by1#y2⊥ by virtue of the the binary term {a1}v1 − {b1}w2 ∈ U .
(2) If h1 =  then x1#x2 = left (v1)#v11 and y3 = v21 for right (v1) = v11v21 , and y1#y2 = left (w)
#right (w). Hence ax1#x2⊥ → by1#y2y3⊥ by virtue of the the binary term {a1}v1 − {b1}w2 ∈ U .
If n ≥ 2 then there exists a sequence of binary terms {ai}vi − {bi}wi ∈ U , i = 1, . . . , n, and a sequence
of strings hi ∈ U ∗, i = 1, . . . , n, such that
(1) {a}x1x2y3 = {a1}v1h1
(2) {bi}wihi = {ai+1}vi+1hi+1 for i = 1, . . . , n− 1
(3) {bn}wnhn = {b}y1y2
and such that for some i the longest common sufﬁx of y3 and hi is .
(1) If there is an i < n such that the longest common sufﬁx of y3 and hi is  then, by induction
hypothesis,
ax1#x2 →∗ bn−1 left (wn−1)#right (wn−1)hn−1y3
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Now,wehave thatbn−1left (wn−1)#right (wn−1)hn−1 = anleft (vn)#right (vn)hn and that {b}y1y2 ={bn}wnhn Hence,
bn−1 left (wn−1)#right (wn−1)hn−1y3
= an left (vn)#right (vn)hny3
→ bn left (wn)#right (wn)hny3
= by1#y2y3
(2) Otherwise, the longest common sufﬁx of hn and y3 is . Let s be the longest common sufﬁx of
y3 and the hi for i < n, and let y ′3, h
′
i (1 ≤ i < n) be such that y3 = y ′3s and h′i = his. Hence, we
also have that
(a) {a}x1x2y ′3 = {a1}v1h′1
(b) {bi}wih′i = {ai+1}vi+1h′i+1 for i = 1, . . . , n− 2
and for some i < n the longest common sufﬁx of y ′3 and h
′
i is . Hence, by induction
hypothesis,
ax1#x2 →∗ bn−1 left (wn−1)#right (wn−1)h′n−1y3′
Now, we have that {bn−1}wn−1hn−1 = {an}vnhn , that is wn−1h′n−1s = vnhn. Since s is a sufﬁx of y3,
and since the longest common sufﬁx of y3 and hn is , we conclude that hn = , and s is a sufﬁx
of vn. We decompose vn = v1ns and obtain that
bn−1 left (wn−1)#right (wn−1)h′n−1y ′3
= an left (vn)#v1ny3′
→ bn left (wn)#right (wn)sy ′3
= bn left (wn)#right (wn)hny3
= by1#y2y3. 
References
[1] G. Lowe, An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public key authentication protocol, Information Processing Letters
56 (3) (1995) 131–133.
[2] J. Clark, J. Jacob, A survey of authentication protocol literature, http://www.cs.york.ac.uk/∼jac/papers/
drareviewps.ps, 1997.
[3] F. Jacquemard, Security protocols open repository, 2003. Available at http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/index.html.
[4] AVISPA Project, Avispa protocol library, 2003. Available at http://www.avispa-project.org/.
[5] M. Abadi, A.D. Gordon, A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus, Information and Computation 148
(1) (1999) 1–70.
[6] M. Abadi, P. Rogaway, Reconciling two views of cryptography (the computational soundness of formal encryption),
in: Proceedings of the 1st IFIP International Conference on Theoretical Computer Science (IFIP-TCS), Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1872, Springer-Verlag, 2000, pp. 3–22.
622 P. Lafourcade et. al. / Information and Computation 205 (2007) 581–623
[7] D. Dolev, A. Yao, On the security of public-key protocols, in: Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 29, IEEE
Computer Society Press, 1983, pp. 198–208.
[8] V. Cortier, S. Delaune, P. Lafourcade, A survey of algebraic properties used in cryptographic protocols, Journal of
Computer Security 14 (1) (2006) 1–43.
[9] IEEE 802.11 Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Wireless LAN Medium Acess Control (MAC) and Physical
(PHY) Speciﬁcations, 1999. URL http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/802/11/main.html.
[10] L. Gong, Using one-way functions for authentication, SIGCOMM Computer Communication 19 (5) (1989) 8–11.
[11] J. Bull, D.J. Otway, The authentication protocol, Tech. Rep. DRA/CIS3/PROJ/CORBA/SC/1/CSM/436-04/03,
Defence Research Agency, 1997.
[12] H. Comon-Lundh, V. Shmatikov, Intruder deductions, constraint solving and insecurity decision in presence of ex-
clusive or, in: Proceedings of the 18th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LICS’03), IEEE
Comp. Soc. Press, Ottawa (Canada), 2003, pp. 271–280.
[13] Y. Chevalier, R. Küsters, M. Rusinowitch, M. Turuani, An NP decision procedure for protocol insecurity with XOR,
in: Proceedings of the 18th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LICS’03), IEEE Comp. Soc.
Press, Ottawa (Canada), 2003, pp. 261–270.
[14] J. Millen, V. Shmatikov, Symbolic protocol analysis with products and Difﬁe-Hellman exponentiation, in: Pro-
ceedings of the 16th Computer Security Foundation Workshop (CSFW’03), IEEE Comp. Soc. Press, Paciﬁc Grove
(California, USA), 2003, pp. 47–62.
[15] Y. Chevalier, R. Küsters, M. Rusinowitch, M. Turuani, Deciding the security of protocols with Difﬁe-Hellman
exponentiation and products in exponents, in: P.K. Pandya, J. Radhakrishnan (Eds.), FSTTCS, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol. 2914, Springer, 2003, pp. 124–135.
[16] H. Comon-Lundh, R. Treinen, Easy intruder deductions, in: N. Dershowitz (Ed.), Veriﬁcation: Theory and Practice,
Essays Dedicated to Zohar Manna on the Occasion of His 64th Birthday, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol.
2772, Springer-Verlag, 2003, pp. 225–242.
[17] S. Delaune, Easy intruder deduction problems with homomorphisms, Information Processing Letters 97 (6) (2006)
213–218.
[18] S. Delaune, P. Lafourcade, D. Lugiez, R. Treinen, Symbolic protocol analysis in presence of a homomorphism
operator and exclusive or, in: Proceedings of the 33rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and
Programming (ICALP’06), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4052, Springer, Venice, Italy, 2006, pp. 132–141.
[19] S. Delaune, An undecidability result for AGh, Theoretical Computer Science, To appear.
[20] M. Baudet, Deciding security of protocols against off-line guessing attacks, in: Proceedings of the 12th ACM Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS’05), ACM Press, Alexandria, Virginia, USA, 2005, pp.
16–25.
[21] S. Delaune, F. Jacquemard, A decision procedure for the veriﬁcation of security protocols with explicit destruc-
tors, in: V. Atluri, B. Pﬁtzmann, P. McDaniel (Eds.), Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS’04), ACM Press, Washington, DC, USA, 2004, pp. 278–287.
[22] M. Abadi, V. Cortier, Deciding knowledge in security protocols under equational theories, in: Proceedings of 31st
International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP’04), Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol. 3142, Springer-Verlag, Turku (Finland), 2004, pp. 46–58.
[23] M. Abadi, V. Cortier, Deciding knowledge in security protocols under (many more) equational theories, in: CSFW
’05: Proceedings of the 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW’05), IEEE Computer Society,
Washington, DC, USA, 2005, pp. 62–76.
[24] Y. Chevalier, M. Rusinowitch, Combining intruder theories, in: L. Caires, G.F. Italiano, L. Monteiro, C. Palamidessi,
M. Yung (Eds.), ICALP, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3580, Springer, 2005, pp. 639–651.
[25] H. Comon-Lundh, Intruder theories (ongoingwork), in: Proceedings of the 7th International Conference onFounda-
tions of Software Science and Computation Structures (FOSSACS’04), LNCS, vol. 987, Springer-Verlag, Barcelona
(Spain), 2004, pp. 1–4.
[26] N. Durgin, P. Lincoln, J. Mitchell, A. Scedrov, Undecidability of bounded security protocols, in: Proceedings of the
Workshop on Formal Methods and Security Protocols (FMSP’99), Trento (Italy), 1999.
[27] J. Millen, V. Shmatikov, Constraint solving for bounded-process cryptographic protocol analysis, in: Proceedings of
the 8th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS’01), ACM Press, 2001, pp. 166–175.
P. Lafourcade et. al. / Information and Computation 205 (2007) 581–623 623
[28] M. Tatebayashi, N. Matsuzaki, D.B. Newman, Key distribution protocol for digital mobile communication systems,
in: Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference (CRYPTO’89), LNCS, vol. 435, Springer-
Verlag, Santa Barbara (California, USA), 1989, pp. 324–333.
[29] D. Prawitz, Natural Deduction, a Proof-Theoretical Study, Almquist and Wiksell, 1965.
[30] D. Basin, S.Mödersheim, LucaViganó, Ofmc: a symbolicmodel checker for security protocols, International Journal
of Information Security 4 (3) (2005) 181–208, published online December 2004.
[31] M. Turuani, The CL-Atse protocol analyser, in: F. Pfenning (Ed.), 17th International Conference on Term Rewriting
and Applications, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4098, Springer, Seattle, WA, USA, 2006, pp. 277–286.
[32] N. Dershowitz, J.-P. Jouannaud, Rewrite systems, in: J. van Leeuwen (Ed.), Handbook of Theoretical Computer
Science, Formal Models and Semantics, vol. B, Elsevier Science Publishers and The MIT Press, 1990, pp. 243–320,
Chapter 6.
[33] F. Baader, T. Nipkow, Term Rewriting and All That, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
[34] P. Lafourcade, D. Lugiez, R. Treinen, Intruder deduction for AC-like equational theories with homomorphisms,
Research Report LSV-04-16, LSV, ENS de Cachan, November 2004.
[35] D.A. McAllester, Automatic recognition of tractability in inference relations, Journal of the ACM 40 (2) (1993)
284–303.
[36] L. Dickson, Finiteness of the odd perfect and primitive abundant numbers with n prime factors, American Journal
Mathematical Society 35 (1913) 413–422.
[37] D. Caucal, On the regular structure of preﬁx rewriting, Theoretical Computer Science 106 (1) (1992) 61–86.
[38] M. Rusinowitch, M. Turuani, Protocol insecurity with ﬁnite number of sessions is NP-complete, in: Proceedings of
the 14th Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW’01), IEEE Comp. Soc. Press, Cape Breton (Canada),
2001, pp. 174–190.
[39] P. Lafourcade, D. Lugiez, R. Treinen, Intruder deduction forAC-like equational theories with homomorphisms, in: J.
Giesl (Ed.), Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Rewriting Techniques and Applications (RTA’05),
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 467, Springer-Verlag, Nara, Japan, 2005, pp. 308–322.
[40] P. Lafourcade, Intruder deduction for the equational theory of exclusive-or with commutative and distributive en-
cryption, in: Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Security and Rewriting Techniques (SecReT’06),
Venice, Italy, 2006.
